Authored by Jack Saunders for PPI
The Pacific Pension & Investment Institute (PPI) convened in Toronto, Canada, July 22-24, 2026. The roundtable theme, “The New Disorder: Capital, Conflict, and Rules That No Longer Hold,” captured the moment and provided compelling fodder for discussion. Members addressed how geopolitical shifts, advances in artificial intelligence (AI), and evolving infrastructure needs are reshaping global investment strategies. Sessions highlighted challenges and opportunities inherent in a fragmented international order, increased defense spending, AI integration and asset allocation, and infrastructure transformation amid energy demands.
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The United States appears set to resume its recent growth pattern of approximately 2.8 percent after 2.2 percent in 2025. A tariff plateau is integral to this more bullish case. The U.S. administration appears more focused on maintaining the tariff regime than on further increases, likely to avoid additional price hikes before the midterm elections.
European trends appear generally weaker, in part because technology contributes significantly less to European growth. German fiscal expansion driven by defense spending may provide a short-term boost, and Spain may also remain a bright spot, but France offers a countervailing case. Deficits, debt, and taxation are high, and the appetite to cut social spending is absent.
China’s macroeconomic story is two-fold. Manufacturing for export to the global economy remains strong due to cost advantages and could pull the growth forecast higher. Yet the domestic economy drags heavily on growth, in part because its housing bubble has burst. Taken together, China’s historically high trade surplus appears set to continue growing.
Investors will continue to monitor the relative rewards for alpha and beta based on these inputs, and newer asset allocation methods will help.
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Total Portfolio Approach (TPA) methods in
creasingly frame how investors think about asset allocation. The essence of TPA is that it allows an investor to accept a wider tracking error to adjust the portfolio and achieve higher compound returns dynamically. This is closer to an absolute-return mindset, an improvement over relative-return mindsets that ignore risk within benchmarks.
The options market can inform investors about how to create that additional upside. It distinguishes between upside and downside volatility, unlike the Sharpe model, which assumes they are symmetrical. Importantly, it often takes time for this upside to materialize, and investors who adopt this asset allocation model first need to build trust with their board, so they are not stopped out along the way.
The foundation of that trust is understanding the drawdown that the board can endure and conveying to the board how staff will manage risk to respect that boundary. Focusing on drawdown instead of a reference portfolio is also advantageous because the diversification assumed by the reference portfolio is absent in stressed markets.
Trust is a comparative advantage once an investor gains it. Higher trust means fewer constraints. One example is re-risking during a market phase change. An investor who can see others’ constraints and re-risk when they choose is likely to profit.
Building and maintaining this trust is an ongoing effort for investors.
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The work of asset owners—and the managers who support them—is to allocate assets in ways that finance pensions or meet other long-term needs, subject to board and sponsor oversight. This is about managing risk and uncertainty effectively, rather than filling out portfolios based on prior market prices and then assessing them against broad index benchmarks.
Investors increasingly focus on the liquidity of assets rather than whether they are traded publicly or privately. Their diversification effect appears overstated because correlations tighten under stress, and what distinguishes them is that public market investments are the primary source of total fund liquidity for repositioning.
Investors will apply these decision-making methods to AI-related allocations. Top-down, it is clear that AI will drive massive transformation; that the specific winners and losers will not be clear for some time; and that the pace and path of the transition will be uneven.
Markets with those traits tend to reward long-term risk-taking by investors who think critically about the entire distribution of opportunity, not just means and medians, and can shift it a bit to the right.
Many other decisions are necessarily bottom-up right now. It is difficult at best to define a top-down AI factor, and even when one seems to come into focus, it is obsolete within months. Underwriting securities and portfolios at the pace that AI is moving through the markets is challenging enough.
Steering portfolios through these and many other choices will remain allocators’ top priority. From their perspective, modern economies have many buffers that can absorb noise, geopolitical or otherwise, and allow them to focus on the trends most likely to matter over time.
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The pandemic shock fundamentally changed investors’ approach to liquidity in private markets. Liquidity was critical; many investors had to turn to the secondaries market, and they learned along the way that secondaries can be helpful in more ordinary times as well. The result was destigmatization.
Limited Partners (LPs) can use secondaries to trim and concentrate portfolios to achieve the specific risk profile they seek. For instance, LPs commonly want growth exposure and may rebalance via the secondary market when a particular fund holds more mature companies that choose to remain private. General Partner (GP) buyers also benefit because they can purchase assets continuously, at the pace of their underwriting discipline.
Net asset value (NAV) financing also offers important tools. These loans are an option when an LP wants to continue holding an investment but also access liquidity. They can also allow a GP to continue adding attractive companies to a portfolio late in its life, after all investment capital has been called, or to fund capital calls without having to sell on the secondary market.
Evergreen structures and regulatory change are helping retail investors enter the private markets. In general, the volume of these private wealth inflows does not seem large enough to affect institutional pricing anytime soon – with one clear exception. AI companies often turn to high-net-worth investors first and at levels that can affect institutional deal flow.
Institutions may experience a shift in the supply of co-investment opportunities as retail participation in private markets grows. No-fee/no-carry deals can make sense for GPs when the LP is committed to making investments when they are available. Institutional LPs that negotiate these deals do not always follow through on co-investments, though, and private wealth investors can be more efficient for GPs in those cases.
Institutional LPs may benefit from making faster, more effective decisions on co-investment opportunities and from remaining diligent about the risk of liquidity mismatches for GPs, including pursuing limits on the overall size of a fund and the share of it accessible to retail investors.
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Agentic AI is just one component of this overall investment, but it may have the biggest eventual impact. It can:
Investors may benefit as much from what they can learn and scale from these investments as from the returns on particular positions right now. Owners can benefit particularly because, given the duration of liabilities, the exact pace at which this unfolds is less important.
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Investors must adjust their asset allocation as the AI revolution unfolds. Markets want to know which companies will be winners and which will be losers. This is a reasonable question, given the low volatility of mega-cap equities and investment-grade credit, but that reflects net inflows more than investment certainty. Single-name volatility within these indices is high, and AI thematic risk is concentrated.Rebalancing has served long-term investors well over time and will likely continue to do so. This measured approach can also help investors better understand the problems they are trying to solve or the risk-taking they are financing with AI allocations.Looking ahead, AI is very capital-intensive, so productivity gains are likely to spread much more slowly than from the internet, to which AI is often compared. Time is an asset for investors.
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Multiple types of companies are part of the AI mobility transition. These include vehicle manufacturers, owners, drivers—whether human or AI—and platforms such as Uber, Lyft, and others. Businesses compete within these categories but have to cooperate across them. For instance, a company providing AI driver technology depends on the manufacturer, vehicle owner, and platform being compatible with that service.
Investors’ underwriting of these assets will include bottom-up thinking, such as the market for data generated by AI-driven vehicles, and top-down considerations, such as the asset class or risk factor that will house investments with venture-style upside today but potentially infrastructure-like cash flows in the future.
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Pax Americana has ended. Historical allies of the United States are not going to extend that trust to the U.S. again. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated this fact out loud in his speech at Davos.
China is using transatlantic friction to sharpen its message to Europe: “What you see is what you get with us, but Americans are so unpredictable.”
By contrast, Russia is threatening Europe, and European countries’ responses vary widely. Poland and the Nordic and Baltic countries are truly committed to investment in their defense. German defense investment appears substantially motivated by national economic competitiveness. In some other countries, the commitment to defense spending seems more like rhetoric than reality.
One fact is clear. U.S. influence around the world will be lower for the long term. The U.S. has dismantled large parts of its diplomatic apparatus, and even if more traditional administrations return to power, they will have to spend time and money rebuilding rather than using those tools.
Other inferences also seem likely. Tariffs seem entrenched. Critical mineral competition appears persistent. Alliance relationships may rebound partially from their severe low today.
Foremost, whatever replaces Pax Americana is likely to be more complex.
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The driving question for countries and institutions around the world today is, “What’s next?” The question does not have an answer right now. Indeed, the recent world order may be replaced by multiple orders operating in parallel. Investors would find that particularly challenging because capital may not flow freely, constraining the investable universe.
Innovation is surging within the disruption. Private investors may find the opportunity in next-generation defense technology, but the challenge will be going to where this innovation is happening, in Ukraine. Defense innovation today will achieve scale only if investors finance it where it is occurring.
Investors will help determine “what’s next” by how open they can keep their investable universe, how they take on financing innovation, and how well they can preserve the interconnected industrial base of Western countries.
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Global markets have evolved in a world dominated by the Washington Consensus, a set of governance and policy principles that promoted free markets, fiscal discipline, privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and openness to foreign investment as a path to economic growth. However, the international consensus has waned amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty and diminished American leadership.
Historically, the United States played a central role in shaping the international institutions that supported globalization and global capital markets. As U.S. policy priorities have evolved in recent years, other countries have increasingly reconsidered how these institutions operate and the extent to which they can continue to rely on them. This has left the rest of the world with a few options: reform the existing institutions, create new ones, or return to the pre-WWII world, in which the strong ruled by force.
Even before the recent shift in America’s posture on the global stage, multilateralism was on the rise relative to internationalism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and BRICS (with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa at its core) are regional groupings that have filled gaps left by the United Nations (UN). However, multilateral coalitions of middle powers may only go so far, as all rules need a reliable enforcement mechanism, something non-superpowers have struggled to create.
Additionally, resentment has been growing among many in the Global South who feel that U.S.-led institutions have not served them. Some view the UN Security Council veto structure as creating a two-tiered world, while other emerging economies remain resentful of COVID-19 vaccine delays.
In addition, America’s ability to “go it alone” has been challenged. Failed attempts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz have raised questions about American dominance and the implications for the United States’ ability to defend allies, including Taiwan.
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This emerging and increasingly unstable world order has renewed investor interest in global defense spending. At the same time, advances in military strategy and technology are reshaping how defense budgets are allocated—now and in the future.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has been described as the “lab of war,” with militaries around the world watching for insights into the nature of future warfare. Ukraine is deploying approximately 10,000 drones each day, and these drones have inflicted heavy casualties on Russian forces. The widespread use of these systems has created a “death zone” where traditional military assets, such as armored vehicles, are no longer viable, forcing soldiers to seek protection underground. The conflict has also accelerated the development of anti-drone technologies, which have intercepted more than 90 percent of incoming drones. Looking ahead, the next generation of military innovation will likely include drone swarms, fully autonomous drones, and microwave-based counter-drone technologies.
Beyond driving higher defense spending across NATO countries, the war in Ukraine has also accelerated the adoption of emerging technologies and challenged the longstanding military procurement preference for maintaining legacy systems.
These new realities of warfare have raised important questions about how nation-states will interact, as technologies such as drones may have effectively leveled the playing field. Throughout history, the balance of power has shifted between offensive and defensive technologies. During the 20th century, wealthier countries held a decisive advantage because advanced weapons—tanks, fighter jets, and aircraft carriers—were expensive and required lengthy procurement cycles. As drones become the defining technology of modern conflict, however, cutting-edge military capabilities are becoming accessible to a much wider range of countries, potentially emboldening more states to engage in conflict.
The conflict in Iran has also reshaped how investors view the Gulf states. Historically, the Gulf states have been a source of capital, but they are increasingly a source of investment opportunities. Some fear that the current regional conflict may be undermining the Gulf’s value proposition as a safe place to invest. The conflict with Iran has highlighted the need for investment in infrastructure, redundancies in water production and oil transportation, and missile defense. The need for pipelines to divert oil and gas away from the chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz has become apparent.
This conflict has had several important economic consequences, highlighting the volatility geopolitics can cause. First and foremost, other oil-producing nations, including Canada, Venezuela, and Norway, have benefited by helping offset disruptions to the global oil supply. A second-order effect has been a renewed focus on the vulnerability of strategic chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, prompting investors and geopolitical analysts to examine other critical chokepoints. These include geographic routes such as the Northwest Passage, as well as economic chokepoints such as China’s dominance in rare earth mineral refining, Taiwan’s central role in semiconductor manufacturing, and vulnerabilities in global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains.
Finally, the conflict has underscored the growing difficulty of predicting and pricing geopolitical events. Ongoing challenges surrounding U.S.-Iran negotiations have provided little clarity on how or when the conflict and the associated disruption to global shipping may be resolved. As a result, investors are increasingly grappling with the prospect that the international community may not return to the pre-conflict norm of largely unrestricted freedom of navigation.
From an investment perspective, investing in defense companies has long been controversial, and some investors have categorically avoided it. However, recent global events have made defense investment seem more inevitable. In addition, defense investment is increasingly understood to include critical infrastructure such as ports, rail lines, manufacturing hubs, and telecommunications and cybersecurity technologies, which may be more palatable to defense-shy investors than traditional weapons procurement.
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AI has quickly become one of the defining technologies shaping investment across nearly every industry. Increasingly, however, AI is also influencing how asset allocators make investment decisions. A central question is no longer whether to integrate AI into the investment process, but how and to what extent. At the most basic level, often described as “Level 1,” humans retain responsibility for all key tasks. At Level 2, AI serves as an advisor; at Level 3, it assists with key tasks; at Level 4, it can act as a decision-maker; and at Level 5, the human’s role is largely limited to oversight.
Some asset allocators are already deploying AI in Level 4 and, in certain applications, even Level 5 roles. In private markets, for example, AI is used to identify promising companies, evaluate investment opportunities, and help determine the optimal timing for investments and exits.
More commonly, AI is being deployed to handle work traditionally assigned to junior analysts. This has fueled concerns about a “lost generation” of talent, in which early-career employees fail to gain the experience needed to advance into senior leadership roles. In response, some companies have developed simulated projects to give junior employees foundational experience while AI handles much of their traditional work.
All asset allocators are grappling with the best ways to combine the advantages of humans and AI systems. The two key issues in this space are explainability and diagnosability. When an AI makes an investment decision, it remains critically important that the AI can explain how and why it made that decision.
Fundamentally, humans must be able to stand behind all decisions, and asset allocators are already considering ways to increase accountability and transparency in AI use. One key principle is that there must always be a “human in the loop,” or at least a “human on top of the loop,” to stand behind decisions. This is especially important in situations where people need to make judgment calls in environments with limited data or few historical examples for training models.
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Despite the incredible promise, AI adoption still faces challenges. First, people need to be trained to use the AI they are expected to use. In this regard, an AI adoption strategy can be as important as an AI strategy alone and more meaningful than traditional metrics such as AI spending. Second, the cost of AI can quickly balloon, creating problems for the bottom line. Many organizations are evaluating token usage and determining the best balance between avoiding lag and spending efficiently.
Although there is pressure to stay at the cutting edge, some organizations recognize the advantage of being a “second mover” in the AI space. Developing and deploying frontier AI models has proven incredibly expensive, while being a “fast follower” may allow some organizations to reap many of the same benefits at a lower cost.
The social and political backlash against AI has also become an important consideration for investors. For example, New York State recently announced a moratorium on building new data centers. Opposition to AI has emerged from multiple directions, with concerns about job displacement among the most prominent.
A less-discussed but equally important issue concerns the data used to train cutting-edge large language models. Much of this content is copyrighted and sourced from publicly available materials, including scientific journals, websites, music, and films. The creators whose work made these systems possible have not been compensated. As AI reshapes the global economy, asset allocators must consider the broader social and economic implications of the technologies they invest in.
Within companies, AI offers multiple avenues for value creation. On many digital platforms, AI has replaced humans in customer service interactions. AI can also make a typical employee orders of magnitude more productive; this has been most evident in software development, where some coders can be ten times more efficient than before. AI can also deliver significant cost savings by replacing consultants’ work and providing quicker, cheaper answers to key organizational questions. Furthermore, because of its labor-maximizing ability, AI has the potential to drastically reduce the cost of starting and scaling a business, allowing thinly capitalized start-ups to succeed with less outside investment.
There are also concerns about the governance structures of some leading AI tech companies. The dual-class share structure has made it difficult for investors to exercise management oversight or influence over how these companies are run. There is also concern about how long many of these emerging AI-based tech companies are spending in private markets. Not only does this limit retail investors’ opportunities to share in their growth, but staying in private markets longer may also lead to less oversight.
Although there is still tremendous uncertainty about AI’s future, asset allocators are investing for a world in which AI grows in importance, driven by both the allure of a world where AI is abundant, useful, and benevolent and the fear of missing out on the next industrial revolution.
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AI has also had a profound impact on the infrastructure investment landscape. A decade ago, infrastructure investing was largely associated with traditional assets such as roads, bridges, and airports. Today, however, data centers, battery storage, and energy diversification have become defining assets of the sector.
As a result, infrastructure has evolved beyond the traditional view of a stable, inflation-hedging asset class. Many infrastructure investments now resemble operating businesses, with employees, high operating costs, and exposure to many of the same economic sensitivities as more traditional corporate investments.
This transformation is fuelling a surge in global electricity demand. AI and the rapid expansion of data centers are major drivers, alongside broader electrification trends across industries and households. Each year, global energy demand rises by roughly 1,000 terawatt-hours, equivalent to adding the annual electricity consumption of a country the size of Japan.
Renewable and nuclear energy have been key technologies for meeting this demand. For the last decade, demand for these technologies has been driven by concerns about climate change and a desire to decarbonize economies. Today, energy security and independence, particularly in Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, are increasingly the dominant narrative driving the adoption of these technologies.
Energy investment varies by region. Despite inconsistent political support for green energy solutions in the United States, the country remains an attractive place to build renewable energy projects. China continues to expand all forms of energy to meet its growing demand, including coal, renewables, and, increasingly, nuclear power. In China and other markets, small modular reactors (SMRs) are a developing technology in the nuclear sector. Because SMRs are designed to be smaller and mass-produced, they may avoid the traditional issue of nuclear megaprojects going over budget. Although still unproven at scale, SMRs are intriguing to some infrastructure investors. Across regions, policy support remains a critical factor for many green energy investors.
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In Canada, as in other nations with many and diverse indigenous groups, such as New Zealand and Australia, reconciliation and work with First Nations groups have become increasingly important topics for investors.
For decades, indigenous interests were ignored. Today, reconciliation requires consultation and accommodation with indigenous groups when major infrastructure projects are built on their traditional territory. Major resource projects, such as the recent Cedar LNG project in British Columbia, have involved even greater levels of indigenous ownership and oversight. In this and other examples, successful projects now require investors to understand the new rules of engagement and to partner effectively with indigenous groups.
In places like British Columbia and Alaska, the recognition of indigenous rights has advanced further, with forms of self-government granted to indigenous groups. Well-informed investors must understand these developments to work effectively in these regions.
Canada is blessed with abundant natural resources, a highly educated population, and a history of stable governance. In these uncertain times, Canada can benefit from being a safe place to invest.
From an energy perspective, Canada has become a leader in new SMR technology and remains committed to renewable energy. In this space, government directives have been key, as Canadian federal and provincial governments have been able to shoulder the risk that private players have been unwilling to assume.
The trade dispute with the United States has allowed Canada to diversify its trading network. Canada aims to double non-U.S. trade, particularly by exporting more potash, uranium, and critical minerals to global markets. Canada can now produce some of the world’s most emissions-efficient liquefied natural gas (LNG) and is shipping it to Asia. Canada has also taken the opportunity to sign bilateral trade agreements with other middle powers.
Canada is positioning itself as a reliable partner in an unpredictable world. Many nations prefer to buy Canadian oil rather than Russian or Middle Eastern alternatives. In this sense, Canada has benefited from recent geopolitical instability.
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India is a country of striking contrasts that continues to challenge conventional assumptions. It is a diverse, fast-growing nation marked by significant inequality alongside a rapidly expanding middle class. Deeply rooted in tradition yet increasingly modern, India has surpassed some Western countries in women’s representation in business leadership and government, while still lagging in other measures of gender equality.
India’s colonial history has shaped its enduring commitment to strategic autonomy. After independence, India adopted a policy of non-alignment, maintaining ties with both the Soviet Union and the United States. This reflected a pragmatic approach among the country’s early leaders, many of whom had been prominent figures in the anti-colonial movement.
Today, India remains an important partner to Western nations while maintaining some ties with Russia. Shared strategic concerns about China’s growing influence have brought India closer to the United States. At the same time, recent strains in the U.S.-India relationship have prompted India to deepen its economic ties with other middle powers through a growing number of trade agreements.
Despite recent strains in the bilateral relationship, India and Canada continue to maintain strong economic ties. Over the past decade, Canadian pension funds have invested more than $100 billion in the Indian economy, underscoring India’s importance as a long-term investment destination. More recently, the two countries strengthened their economic relationship through a multi-billion-dollar uranium supply agreement.
India is too large to ignore as an investment destination. The country estimates it will require $22 trillion in infrastructure investment and is adding roughly $250 billion to its GDP each year. Although investors often categorize countries as either safe or risky, India’s complexity defies such simple classifications. Many Indian states have populations larger than entire European countries, each with distinct opportunities and governance challenges. As such, India cannot be viewed simply as another emerging market but as a diverse economy with a rapidly growing middle class and rising consumer spending power.
The Indian bureaucracy can be challenging for foreign investors. Although India has an extremely meritocratic bureaucracy, there remains considerable red tape, as different levels of government may delay projects for various reasons. In these cases, local expertise can be useful. However, governments are shifting toward a more pro-business mindset, with growth increasingly the primary goal.
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